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ABSTRACT
We examine the effect of public debt on private investment in selected emerging
economies. Using a panel threshold regression model, we estimate a threshold value
of about 3 percent, on average, below which public debt stimulates private investment.
Our additional analysis involving selected developed economies suggests that the
crowding out effect is less evident relative to the emerging economies as higher public
debt stocks do not seem to significantly undermine their private investments. These
results have implications for debt sustainability and maintaining a reasonable public
debt–GDP ratio is crucial for sustainable investment growth.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this study, we examine the crowding-out effect of government borrowing in
selected emerging and advanced economies, using a panel threshold regression
model. This model enables us to determine the threshold level below (above)
which public debt strengthens (undermines) private investment. The past decade
has been characterized by a broad-based increase in the debt stock of various
economies with serious concerns about its attendant impact on investment and,
by extension, economic growth. For instance, since 20101, the debt stock of both
emerging markets and the developing economies increased by 60 percent points of
GDP to an all-time high of over 170 percent of GDP in 2019 (see Kose et al., 2020).
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic among other crises has worsened the
debt experience (see Kose et al., 2020; Law et al., 2021).
Notwithstanding the debt crisis being witnessed globally, borrowing is of
economic significance in several ways among the sources of funds for financing
various expenditures of the government. First, the central bank can influence the
money supply by buying and selling government securities, which is a plausible
option for effective monetary policy operations. Second, borrowing avoids the
negative effects of taxes on incentives, especially if taxes are raised considerably
above the ‘prohibitive’ range (see Laffer, 2004). In other words, borrowing allows
the government to spend more money than it would otherwise be able to. In
addition, when government borrows externally, it gains access to a larger amount
of foreign currency, which allows it to finance the import of capital goods that are
vital for economic growth. Essentially, government’s borrowing from the domestic
market comes at the cost of higher interest rates, which impose more burden on
the budget and reflects in the cost of private sector financing and the availability of
financing of private sector—crowding out (Al-Majali, 2018).
Moreover, the discussions around the effects of government borrowing on
private investment can be summarized in twofold. First, it crowds out private
investment since a high public debt is a burden on the economy2 and forces the
government to increase taxes in the future to service the debt (Mabula and Mutasa,
2019); alternatively, the high public debt can potentially increase interest rates
since the government may decide to incur more debt to service existing debt stock
(see Anyanwu et al., 2018). Second, public debt may crowd-in private investment
if used to finance infrastructures, which are self-financing (Mabula and Mutasa,
2019). In other words, there are two sides to public debt—it can either crowd-in or
crowd-out private investment depending on the development agenda and policy
choice of the government. Following this, empirical analyses on debt-investment
nexus remain inconclusive, with some studies providing supportive evidence that
public debt spurs private investment (see Al-Majali, 2018; Anyanwu et al., 2018;
Liaqat, 2019; Antunes and Ercolani, 2020), while others find that it crowds out
private investment (see Ardagna et al., 2007; Khan and Gill, 2009; Fayed, 2013;
Ntshakala, 2015).

1
2

See Jacob et al. (2011) for an empirical analysis of debt market behaviour during this period.
The adverse effect of public debt on economic growth is well articulated in the literature (see for
example, Daud, 2020).
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The new thinking in the debt sustainability analysis is the possibility of
nonlinearity between public debt and private investment, whereby the former
can either stimulate or undermine the latter depending on the threshold level of
public debt (see Chang and Chiang, 2011; Lau et al., 2019; Mabula and Mutasa
2019; Caner et al., 2021; Kassouri et al., 2021; Law et al., 2021). However, there is
no study, to the best of our knowledge, that offers a broader perspective to the
subject matter whereby the nexus is conducted distinctly for a group of emerging
economies as well as the developed economies and whereby a threshold level
of debt is simultaneously determined. This is the contribution of our study. In
addition, aside being grossly understudied, our choice of the emerging economies
is also underscored by the halt that usually greet the flow of private financing
into the economies following crises.3 During the early period of COVID-19 crisis,
for instance, the IMF put the estimate of private portfolio capital that exited these
economies to above one hundred billion dollars. This is expected to limit the
funding options of these economies (see Ocampo, 2020) and, consequently, has
an implication for the management of debt and private investment. The study
is further motivated by the fact that the outcome of such group analyses would
offer a useful guide to regional, international, and multilateral agencies, who are
usually required to determine thresholds for different macroeconomic variables to
ensure the actualization of development goals across countries. Thus, following
the studies by Kremer et al. (2013), and Panizza and Presbitero (2013) on the
threshold and nonlinearity feature of debt–growth nexus, this study examines the
effect of public debt on private investment in twelve emerging market economies
from 1990 to 2020 using a panel threshold regression model. For robustness, we
repeat the same analysis for five developed countries in order to check for possible
heterogeneous effect of public debt on the two economic classifications.
In summary, we establish evidence for a nonlinear relationship between public
debt and private investment for the emerging market economies, thereby lending
credence to the findings by Lau et al. (2019) and Mabula and Mutasa (2019),
who report similar results for Malaysia and Tanzania, respectively. However,
our finding is in contrast with that of Law et al. (2021), who failed to accept the
hypothesis of nonlinear relationship between the two variables, in the sample of
developing economies they considered. We also obtain a significant threshold
value of about 3 percent, on average, below which public debt stimulates private
investment. In addition, while the nonlinear relationship is still upheld for
the advanced economies, the crowding-out effect is less evident relative to the
emerging economies as higher public debt stocks do not seem to significantly
undermine their private investments, on average. Therefore, we conclude that the
response of both economic classifications to higher debt stocks is heterogeneous.
Following this introduction, Section II reviews the related theoretical literature,
Section III presents the methodology and data, Section IV discusses the results
while Section V concludes.

3

This played out after the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and such is repeating itself in the wake of
the COVID-19 pandemic.
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II. THEORETICAL LITERATURE
Debt–investment relation has a strong backing in the theoretical literature and
two significant views are usually referenced. First, the conventional view holds
that public debt is necessary to enhance aggregate income and demand and, by
extension, the aggregate output through increase in capital accumulation over
the period (see Eisner, 1992). In this regard, governments can stimulate economic
growth using deficit, causing an expansionary fiscal policy with the assumption of
no full employment and that the interest rate sensitivity of investment is low. Under
risk diversification, the access to safe government assets allows banks to take more
risk and thus increase their lending to the private sector leading to crowding-in
effect (Chebet and Kiemo, 2017). In addition, Kassouri et al. (2021) argue that the
crowding-in effect is only significant in the short-run when countries are in their
early stages of economic development and possess little amount of capital stock.
Conversely, the liquidity constraint and debt overhang hypotheses hold that
public debt negatively influences investment and by extension economic growth.
The liquidity constraint theory posits that public debt constrains the amount of
credit available to businesses by increasing the cost of borrowing (Hofman and
Reisen, 1991; Chang and Chiang, 2011) and thereby hampers economic growth
through the various channels. Similarly, the debt overhang hypothesis argues
that government borrowing is tantamount to imposing taxes on future output,
and is thus capable of crowding out investment and delaying economic growth
(Krugman, 1988). The foregoing also relates to the ‘lazy bank’ model, which
suggests that access to safe government assets may create moral hazard and thus
discourage banks from lending to the risky private investors, hence leading to
crowding out of private investment.
In addition, issues around the non-linear effects of debt on growth (including
investment) have been raised by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), positing that a
low level of debt can promote productivity growth, while a high level of debt is
disastrous to productivity growth. Hence, in the initial stages of development,
borrowing is encouraged to aid productive investments. Debt accumulation, on
the other hand, operates as a tax on future productivity in the long run, thus,
inhibiting productive private sector investment plans and government adjustment
attempts. In this sense, there is likelihood of an inverted U-shaped relationship
between debt and growth, implying that higher debt levels are associated with
lower long-run productivity (Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015). Meanwhile, reasons
have been alluded to regarding the heterogeneous relationship between debt and
growth (see Kassouri et al., 2021).
More recently, Gosh et al. (2013) propose a new framework on public debt,
which conceptualizes ‘fiscal space’. That is, the difference between country’s
current debt level and its debt limit – the level of debt beyond which fiscal
solvency fails. Therefore, an improvement in a country’s structural characteristics
or productivity raises the debt limit. This implies that an improvement in the
performance of an economy propels public borrowing. Some empirical studies
have examined these theories/postulations (see Kassouri et al., 2021; Law et al.,
2021; among others), and the current study further advances these discussions
with special focus on nonlinearity and threshold effect from the perspectives of
both emerging and developed economies.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss1/9
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Datasets
This paper utilizes yearly data on 12 emerging market and five developed economies
covering a total time span from 1990 to 2020. The countries included in the sample
of emerging market are: Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Thailand, while those considered for
the developed countries are: Australia, Japan, Singapore, United Kingdom, and
United States. Our choice of countries is informed by: (i) most of the countries
considered are ranked very high (i.e., they among 1 to 20) in the country-bycountry ranking of debt using the combination of debt-to-GDP, gross debt, and
percentage of world total in the ranking (see https://www.visualcapitalist.com/69trillion-of-world-debt-in-one-infographic/); and, (ii) data availability. All the data
are sourced from the World Development Indicators (WDI) (see https://databank.
worldbank.org/ source/world-development-indicators). We choose Gross Fixed
Capital Formation (GFCF) in current US$ as a proxy for private investment. Public
and Publicly Guaranteed (PPG) external debt stocks is used to proxy government
borrowing for the emerging market economies, while central government debt4
is used for developed economies based on the tracked dataset by the World
Bank. Related studies have considered GFCF and PPG as proxies of investment
(see Ali, 2015; Pasara and Garidzirai, 2020) and external debt stocks (see Grekou,
2015; Bandiera and Tsiropoulos, 2020), respectively. Similarly, the definition/
description of variables provided by the WDI, equally affirms to the suitability
of these variables as proxies for investment and government debt. For estimation,
we scaled both the dependent and independent variables by GDP and, therefore,
the former is expressed as the ratio of private investment to GDP (privinvgdp),
while the latter is the ratio of public debt to GDP (debtgdp). This transformation
facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients in terms of the international norm
for debt sustainability, which also requires scaling the debt stock by GDP. Other
variables considered are exchange rate, GDP (in constant 2000 US$) and inflation
rate. Finally, inflation and exchange rates are the control variables.5
B. Methodology
We construct a panel threshold regression model to analyze the association
between public debt and private investment in line with the theories and empirical
studies presented in the preceding sections (see also, Kremer et al., 2013). One
of the attractions to the approach used here lies in its ability to determine the
threshold effect endogenously, while accounting for nonlinearity in the nexus.

4

5

This is reported (from the source) in Local Currency Unit (LCU). Therefore, to express in the same
currency unit as other variables such as GFCF, GDP and PPG, the value for each of the countries
considered is divided by their respective exchange rate (expressed in LCU per USD). In addition, we
opt for central government debt as a proxy for government borrowing for the developed economies
due to unavailability of PPG for this class of economies.
Since our interest is to keep the paper as concise as possible, some preliminary analyses such as
descriptive statistics and graphs are suppressed here.
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The estimated panel threshold regression model takes the form (see Hansen, 1999;
Wang, 2015) 6:

(1)
where privinvgdp is ratio of private investment to GDP; debtgdp is the ratio of
public debt to GDP; q is the threshold variable; γ is the threshold parameter that
divides the equation into two regimes with coefficients λ1 and λ2; X is a vector
of control variables (i.e., inflation and exchange rates, which serve as proxies for
macroeconomic environment or stability); μi is the individual effect, while ε is the
disturbance term. Since Equation (1) is a fixed effect panel threshold model, the
within-group estimator, which involves deviations from group means is employed.
The null hypothesis of no threshold effect (i.e., H0: λ1=λ2 implying a linear model) is
tested against the alternative hypothesis (i.e., H1: λ1≠λ2, which implies the presence
of both nonlinearity and threshold effect). We use the bootstrap design of Hansen
(1999) to obtain the F-statistic used to test the significance of the threshold effect
(see also, Wang, 2015).
IV. MAIN FINDINGS
Table 1 presents the estimated debt threshold values for both the emerging market
and the developed economies. The latter economies are included for robustness,
as our focus is on the emerging market economies. Thus, for the former, the debt
threshold value (with or without control) is estimated to be significant at 2.7861
percent. Our estimated threshold values are well below the 64 percent for the
emerging market economies by Caner et al. (2010) and 90 percent for the developed
economies (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). This is expected since we focus on
public debt, while those cited studies capture the total debt stock. Thereafter,
we activate lower and upper debt regimes to evaluate the effects of government
borrowing on private investment (see the coefficients of debtgdp_0 and debtgdp_1 in
Table 1 under the emerging economies category).
Our results show that, below a 3 percent threshold, any increase in public
debt is associated with significant improvement in private investment (with and
without control variables), confirming the crowding-in effect in the emerging
market economies. However, above this threshold value, an increase in public
debt has a negative effect on private investment (crowding-out effect). Thus, a
higher debt profile becomes a threat to private investment in the emerging
market economies. This indicates that, when public debt exceeds this threshold
of about 3 percent for the emerging economies, each additional debt incurred by
the government impedes private investment by 0.224 and 0.207 percentage points
6

An extension of the panel threshold model used here is the dynamic variant of Kremer et al.
(2013) which technically involves including the first lag of the dependent variable as an additional
regression in the model. However, this model is not considered here as it requires small T since it
relies on the IV-GMM approach where large time series observations may lead to proliferation of
instruments.
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(without or with control, respectively). While the reduction in private investmentGDP ratio is minimal (0.2 percent, on average) when the threshold level is
exceeded, maintaining public debt-GDP ratio below the threshold level produces
significantly higher values of private investment-GDP ratio of about 8 percent,
on average (in both cases with and without control values). In other words, at
the public debt level of above the 2.7861 percent, investors are discouraged by
the probable debt overhang, which they believe would (negatively) affect their
profit in a bid for government to service its debt in the future. They may thereby
relocate their businesses to the environment where taxes are expected to be
relatively lower. Thus, with the contrasting evidence between the two regimes, we
provide evidence in support of the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between
public debt and private investment for the emerging economies. Our finding is in
contrast with that of Law et al. (2021). who failed to accept the hypothesis of an
inverted U-shaped relationship between public debt and economic growth in the
developing economies. However, our results are consistent with the findings by
Lau et al. (2019), and Mabula and Mutasa (2019), who report similar results for
Malaysia and Tanzania, respectively. 7
Table 1.
Panel Threshold Results for Public Debt – Private Investment Nexus7
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; debtgdp_0 and debtgdp_1 denote the variables below
and above the threshold respectively; the threshold effect test is F-test based and the critical values are given as
27.7674, 32.1553 and 39.6148 for 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The F-test involves the null hypothesis of no threshold
(implying a linear relationship) against the alternative hypothesis of the presence of threshold effect (implying a
nonlinear relationship).

Regime Dependent
Variables
debtgdp_0
debtgdp_1
Constant
Threshold value
Threshold test [debtgdp_0 vs.
debtgdp_1]
Observations
R-squared
Number of country_id

7

Emerging
Without
With
Control
Control

Developed
Without
With
Control
Control

8.892***
(1.309)
-0.224**
(0.0954)
20.62***
(1.238)
2.7861

8.834***
(1.295)
-0.207**
(0.0948)
20.81***
(1.240)
2.7861

315.8***
(38.55)
0.0129
(0.00893)
18.63***
(0.668)
0.0582

309.9***
(39.30)
0.0111
(0.00951)
18.89***
(0.929)
0.0582

47.28***

47.84***

56.22***

52.93***

324
0.158
12

324
0.182
12

155
0.316
5

150
0.320
5

The full results including the control variables can be made available upon request.
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Table 2.
Panel Threshold Results for Public Debt – Private Investment Nexus
(Standardized Results)
Standardized values are derived by taking the ratio of each coefficient with their respective standard error; *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1; debtgdp_0 and debtgdp_1 denote the variables below and above the threshold respectively; the
threshold effect test is F-test based and the critical values are given as 27.7674, 32.1553 and 39.6148 for 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively. The F-test involves the null hypothesis of no threshold (implying a linear relationship) against the
alternative hypothesis of the presence of threshold effect (implying a nonlinear relationship).

Regime Dependent
Variables
debtgdp_0
debtgdp_1
Constant
Threshold value
Threshold test [debtgdp_0 vs.
debtgdp_1]
Observations
R-squared
Number of country_id

Emerging
Without
With
Control
Control

Developed
Without
With
Control
Control

6.7930***
-2.3480**
16.6559***
2.7861

6.8216***
-2.1835**
16.7823***
2.7861

8.1920***
1.4446
27.8892***
0.0582

7.8855***
1.1672
20.3337***
0.0582

47.28***

47.84***

56.22***

52.93***

324
0.158
12

324
0.182
12

155
0.316
5

150
0.320
5

For robustness, we consider a panel of five developed countries, and we find
that, at the lower regime, the coefficient of debt-GDP ratio is positive and significant
at the 1 percent level—with or without control—suggesting a crowding-in effect,
while, at the upper regime, the coefficient is positive but not significant. This
indicates that above the public debt threshold of 0.0582 percent, additional debt
incurred has a negligible deteriorating effect on private investment in the developed
countries. This could be attributed to the nature of projects these additional debts
are committed to, as expenditure on developmental project (such as infrastructure)
could take a longer time before stimulating investment. In addition, as stated in
Equation (1), additional control variables, such as inflation and exchange rate,8
also show that lower public debt ratio (below the threshold value) encourages
private investment in both economies, while the results obtained for the upper
regime remains mixed between the two groups. While the crowding out effect is
evident for the emerging economies, it is less evident for the developed economies
as higher public debt stocks of the latter do not seem to significantly undermine
their private investments, on average.
Furthermore, given the wide gap between the two groups in terms of the
countries covered, our results are standardized to deal with any inherent size effect
by adopting the coefficient of variation approach, which allows for comparison of
samples in different magnitudes (see Table 2). We find that at the lower regime,
public debt crowds-in more private investment in the developed economies than it
does in the emerging economies, while the reverse is the case for the upper regime
as public debt crowds-out more private investment in the emerging economies
than it does for the developed economies. In all, we establish heterogeneous
8

These are considered as control variables given the fact that they usually serve as channels through
which the impact of public borrowing is transmitted to investment.
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responses of private investment to higher public debt stocks in both economies.
This outcome further advances the literature on debt–investment nexus and we
hope future studies will find this evidence useful when revisiting the nexus with
additional contributions that further add value to the extant literature.
V. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the concerns over rising debt stock in the emerging economies (see
Kose et al., 2020) and evidence in the literature suggesting a nonlinear relationship
between debt and growth (see Kremer et al., 2013; Panizza and Presbitero, 2013),
we examine the effect of public debt on private investment in selected emerging
and developed economies. We construct a panel threshold regression model for
the analysis of the debt–growth nexus, while we utilize annual data9 over the
period of 1990 through 2020. Our choice of samples is informed by the availability
of data for the countries considered. Some studies have estimated threshold levels
for debt, beyond which debt may undermine private investment. We contribute to
this strand of the literature within the context of both emerging and developing
economies, while also focusing on public debt rather than total debt stock.
We find that when public debt is below the threshold value of about 3 percent,
private investment tends to respond positively suggesting evidence of crowding-in
effect. However, as debt rises above this threshold, its effect on private investment
becomes significantly negative (crowding-out effect). Thus, we provide evidence
in support of the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between public debt and
private investment for the emerging economies. While there is still evidence of
nonlinear relationship for the advanced economies, the crowding-out effect is
less evident relative to the emerging economies as higher public debt stocks do
not seem to undermine their private investments. Thus, we conclude that private
investment in emerging and developed economies respond heterogeneously to an
increase in public debt. Based on these findings, we recommend that the public
policy makers, especially the fiscal managers, maintain reasonable levels of public
debt ratio that complement private sector’s productivity rather than undermine it.

9

This is sourced from World Development Indicators (WDI). See https://databank.worldbank.org/
source/world-development-indicators

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022

9

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 25, No. 1 [2022], Art. 9
34

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 25, Number 1, 2022

REFERENCES
Ali, G. (2015). Gross Fixed Capital Formation & Economic Growth of
Pakistan. Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Literature Applied, 1, 21-30.
Al-Majali, A. A. (2018). Crowding Out Effect of Public Borrowing: The Case of
Jordan. International Review of Management and Marketing, 8, 119-125.
Antunes, A., & Ercolani, V. (2020). Public Debt Expansions and the Dynamics of
the Household Borrowing Constraint. Review of Economic Dynamics, 37, 1-32.
Anyanwu, A., Gan, C., & Hu, B. (2018). Government Domestic Debt, Private Sector
Credit, and Crowding Out Effect in Oil-dependent Countries. Private Sector
Credit, and Crowding Out Effect in Oil-Dependent Countries (July 15, 2018).
Ardagna, S., Caselli, F., & Lane, T. (2007). Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of
Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD countries. The BE Journal of
Macroeconomics, 7.
Bandiera, L., & Tsiropoulos, V. (2020). A Framework to Assess Debt Sustainability
under the Belt and Road Initiative. Journal of Development Economics, 146,
102495.
Caner, M., Fan, Q., & Grennes, T. (2021). Partners in Debt: An Endogenous Nonlinear Analysis of the Effects of Public and Private Debt on Growth. International
Review of Economics & Finance, 76, 694-711.
Chang, T., & Chiang, G. (2011). Regime-switching Effects of Debt on Real GDP
per Capita the Case of Latin American and Caribbean Countries. Economic
Modelling, 28, 2404-2408.
Chebet, C., & Kiemo, S. (2017). Price Channel versus Quantity Channel: The
Relationship between Government Domestic Borrowing from Commercial
Banks and Private Sector Credit in Kenya. KBA Centre for Research on Financial
Markets & Policy Working Paper Series. WPS/03/17.
Daud, S. N. M. (2020). External Debt, Institutional Quality and Economic
Growth. Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, 23, 221-238.
Eberhardt, M., & Presbitero, A. F. (2015). Public Debt and Growth: Heterogeneity
and Nonlinearity. Journal of International Economics, 97, 45–58.
Eisner, R. (1992). Deficits: Which, How Much, and So What? The American Economic
Review, 82, 295-298.
Fayed, M. E. (2013). Crowding Out Effect of Public Borrowing: The Case of
Egypt. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 107, 28-38.
Grekou, C. (2015). Revisiting the Nexus between Currency Misalignments and
Growth in the CFA Zone. Economic Modelling, 45, 142-154.
Hansen, B. E. (1999). Threshold Effects in Non-dynamic Panels: Estimation,
Testing, and Inference. Journal of Econometrics, 93, 345–368.
Hofman, B., & Reisen, H. (1991). Some Evidence on Debt-related
Determinants of Investment and Consumption in Heavily Indebted
Countries. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 127, 281-299.
Jacobs, P., Abubakar, A., & Siallagan, T. E. (2011). Analysis of Debt Market Indicator
Behaviour. Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, 13, 325-350.
Kassouri, Y., Altıntaş, H., Alancioğlu, E., & Kacou, K. Y. T. (2021). New Insights on
the Debt-growth Nexus: A Combination of the Interactive Fixed Effects and
Panel Threshold Approach. International Economics, 168, 40-55.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss1/9
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v25i1

10

Penzin et al.: A NOTE ON PUBLIC DEBT-PRIVATE INVESTMENT NEXUS IN EMERGING ECONOM
A Note on Public Debt–Private Investment Nexus in Emerging Economies

35

Khan, R. E. A., & Gill, A. R. (2009). Crowding Out Effect of Public Borrowing: A
Case of Pakistan.
Kose, M. A., Ohnsorge, F., Nagle, P., & Sugawara, N. (2020). Caught by the Cresting
Debt Wave Past Debt Crises Can Teach Developing Economies to Cope with
COVID-19 Financing Shocks. Finance and Development, 40-43.
Kremer, S., Bick, A., & Nautz, D. (2013). Inflation and Growth: New Evidence from
a Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis. Empirical Economics, 44, 861-878.
Krugman, P. (1988). Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang. Journal of
Development Economics, 29, 253–268.
Laffer, A. B. (2004). The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future. Backgrounder, 1765,
1-16.
Lau, S. Y., Tan, A. L., & Liew, C. Y. (2019). The Asymmetric Link between Public
Debt and Private Investment in Malaysia. Malaysian Journal of Economic
Studies, 56, 327-342.
Law, S. H., Ng, C. H., Kutan, A. M., & Law, Z. K. (2021). Public Debt and
Economic Growth in Developing Countries: Nonlinearity and Threshold
Analysis. Economic Modelling, 98, 26-40.
Liaqat, Z. (2019). Does Government Debt Crowd Out Capital Formation? A
Dynamic Approach Using Panel VAR. Economics Letters, 178, 86-90.
Mabula, S., & Mutasa, F. (2019). The Effect of Public Debt on Private Investment in
Tanzania. African Journal of Economic Review, 7, 109-135.
Ntshakala, P. L. (2015). Effects of Public Debt on Economic Growth in
Swaziland. International Journal of Business and Commerce, 5, 1-24.
Ocampo, J. A. (2020). Financing and Debt Management for Emerging Market
Economies.
Retrieved
from
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/futuredevelopment/2020/05/26/financing-and-debt-management-for-emergingmarket-economies/
Panizza, U., & Presbitero, A. F. (2013). Public Debt and Economic Growth in
Advanced Economies: A Survey. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 149,
175-204.
Pasara, M. T., & Garidzirai, R. (2020). Causality Effects among Gross Capital
Formation, Unemployment and Economic Growth in South Africa. Economies, 8,
26.
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2010). Growth in a Time of Debt. American Economic
Review, 100, 573-78.
Wang, Q. (2015). Fixed-effect Panel Threshold Model Using Stata. The Stata Journal,
15, 121–134.

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022

11

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 25, No. 1 [2022], Art. 9
36

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 25, Number 1, 2022

This page is intentionally left blank

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss1/9
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v25i1

12

